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Elias L. Rivers
At the inevitable risk of oversimplifi cation, I propose to 
approach as directly as possible a broad and complex question: how 
are we to view in an orderly way the many different social functions of 
language, both oral and written? I will begin with the premise that oral 
language, analyzed abstractly by structuralists as a “semiotic system,” 
is more concretely the human race’s characteristic and fundamental 
social institution; normally acquired within the primary context of the 
family, language makes it possible for families and schools and other 
social organizations to exist and to function, articulating themselves, 
perpetuating themselves and developing historically. Purely mechanical 
inventions, such as the wheel, seem not to depend on language; but 
human families, tribes, city-states, and nations both constitute and are 
constituted by their verbal discourse. And the invention of writing, the 
“technologizing of the word,” as it has been aptly characterized by 
Walter J. Ong, went hand in hand with an economic, social, and cultural 
revolution.
If, then, verbal discourse is in some sense coterminous with 
human society, what are language’s basic social functions? Perhaps 
we can use as a point of departure the famous debate between B. F. 
Skinner of Harvard and Noam Chomsky of M.I.T., the debate (crudely 
put) between, on the one hand, a behavioristic theory of language as a 
limited system of conditioned refl exes and, on the other, a creative theory 
of language as an open system of almost infi nite syntactic possibilities. 
According to Skinner, language—or, rather, “verbal behavior,” which 
in its covert form includes what we normally call “thought” —is simply 
one complicated example of operant conditioning: the human child, like 
Pavlov’s dog salivating at the sound of an electric gong associated with 
meat, learns to
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salivate at the mention of the word for milk, and eventually to ask for 
it by name. Chomsky, on the other hand, emphasizes that the human 
user of language understands and produces new sentences that he or 
she has never heard or said before: human mind in language is thus no 
mere surface refl ex, but has a deep structure that allows it to be original, 
productive of new meanings. (We university intellectuals, needless 
to say, tend to prefer Chomsky’s view, which allows us to function 
meaningfully.)
I will not attempt here to deal with the debatable genetic and 
environmental hypotheses that underlie such metaphors as “deep 
structure” and “surface structure.” The fact is that, phenomenologically, 
each of them—Skinner and Chomsky—seems to account for a different, 
real experience of language; and I submit that both these experiences of 
language must be taken seriously. Thus, those of us who teach foreign 
languages know that there is a basic function of language that can best be 
mastered by pattern drills: the phonology, the morphology, and a great 
deal of syntax may in fact be learned by rote, by operant conditioning. 
In everyday social usage there actually exist many set formulas:
Good morning, how are you today?
Fine, thanks, how are you?
Buenos días, ¿cómo está usted?
Muy Bien, gracias, ¿y usted?
At this level Skinner seems to be right: the conditioned refl ex is all 
there is to this kind of linguistic competence. But, at another level, 
Chomsky seems more appropriate. If, for example, someone asks me, 
“What does it mean to say “Good morning?”, I cannot simply respond 
with a ready-made answer, for I must fi rst think more analytically about 
how sociolinguistic formulas function. Metalinguistic activity is itself 
an essential aspect of certain basic uses of language.
For a more comprehensive, socially oriented theory of language 
than those of Chomsky or Saussure, which are structural theories that 
tend to limit their object of study to single complete sentences as the 
maximum grammatical units, we must, I think, transcend structural 
linguistics altogether and turn toward what I will call sociolinguistics, 
in the broadest pragmatic sense of that word. I have in mind such works 
as the following, in which their authors try to explain how discourse, 
or a sequence of interrelated sentences and paragraphs, works socially: 
Eric Havelock’s Preface
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to Plato (1963),  Walter J. Ong’s Presence of the Word (1967), J. L. 
Austin’s How to Do Things with Words (1975), William Labov’s 
Language of the Inner City (1972), some of Emile Benveniste’s 
Problèmes de linguistique générale (1966-74), Voloshinov’s (or 
Bakhtin’s) Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (1973), and 
Bakhtin’s The Dialogic Imagination (1981). These different theorists 
pose some of the same basic questions concerning the social existence 
and social functions of the language, while using different points of 
departure: the alphabetic revolution in classical Greece, the religious 
function of audible language, performative speech acts, conversational 
narratives as display texts, language as the source of subjectivity, 
conversation as the grassroots matrix of a society’s ideology, and of the 
novel. Despite their differences, it seems to me that they coincide in a 
remarkable degree of consensus. I will now attempt, in my own way, to 
synthesize this consensus, drawing freely on these and other writers. (In 
what follows, only I am responsible for the oversimplifi cations, and for 
any self-contradictions.)
I will begin again with the simple binary opposition suggested by 
Skinner and Chomsky, and will then sketch between these two poles a 
range or spectrum of differentiations. Thus Bakhtin, for example, in The 
Dialogic Imagination, develops the Hegelian opposition between epic 
poetry and the novel as an opposition between aristocratic monoglossia 
and popular heteroglossia; similarly, in his Preface to Plato, Havelock 
shows us how Plato’s Republic deconstructs and replaces Homer’s 
poetry, in much the same way, I would suggest, that Cervantes’ novel 
Don Quixote deconstructs and supersedes romances of chivalry, and 
Lope de Vega’s honor-code theater.
On the “monoglossic” extreme, we have the primitive oral 
community, without writing, a probably authoritarian tribal community 
that depends heavily on the recitation, from memory, of more or less 
fi xed, highly privileged sequences of words, usually in verse and often 
set to music; these word-sequences tend to be used ritualistically, often 
as magical incantations in which the words seem simply to work, to 
convert two single persons, for example, into a married couple (“What 
God hath joined, let no man put asunder”), or to reenact some mythic or 
historic event. This sacramental view of language is aptly characterized 
in scholastic language by the concept of “verba effi cientia,” “words that 
do things”; it is clearly alluded to by Austin’s own references
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to the “outward and visible signs” of an “inward and spiritual act” (1975), 
words taken from the Anglican catechism. The speech act, whether 
rooted in the authority of God’s Word or in that of the community’s 
rules and conventions, tends to function ex opere operato, by public 
performance, regardless of secret or private intentions and subsequent 
behavior. Havelock has described this “pedagogic” function of the 
mimetic recitation of Homer’s poetry in preclassical Greece.
We should not think of this monoglossic, or univocal, function 
of language as something belonging only to an archaic, primitive past. 
Today, in twentieth-century America and elsewhere, ancient and modern 
texts still work in the same way, for many people at least. Margaret A. 
Doody has described what happens to her when she recites a sixteenth-
century “General Confession” from the Book of Common Prayer. These 
are some of the words that she quotes:
We acknowledge and bewail our manifold sins and wickedness,
Which we from time to time most grievously have committed,
By thought, word, and deed, against thy Divine Majesty. Provoking 
most justly thy wrath and indignation against us.
“The old forms. . . ,” she comments, “with their doublets of words and 
phrases, with the varied repetitions combined with the building up of 
clauses in a tension which has to be acknowledged by a slowing of pace, 
make an enactment which is something more than fl at statement. . . . 
The speaker at the end is different from the speaker at the beginning” 
(1980:111-12). And, she says, “. . .there is a tradition, a view of human 
nature older than Romanticism and quite alien to modern notions of 
sincerity, according to which outer actions and words spoken can create 
the feelings and move the desires” (108).
Similarly, it seems to me, singing The Star-Spangled Banner 
at an American football game in front of the fl ag may well induce a 
transformation of the individual: putting one’s heart into it, as the saying 
goes, he or she may become once more a member of the patriotic football 
community by such a performance, by virtue of the rhymes and reasons 
of “the rockets’ red glare, and bombs bursting in air,” words that can 
work when sung, even though they may seem semantically irrelevant 
when analytically transcribed or
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translated into a written text.
In Spanish literature the plays written by Lope de Vega 
constitute a sort of secular liturgy. Fuenteovejuna, for example, 
despite its revolutionary violence, is highly lyrical in its versifi cation, 
appealing to the social ideals and wishful thinking of its audience, 
which easily identifi ed with the romantic characters, the innocent pair 
of young country fi ancés, threatened by the sexual abuses of the corrupt 
Comendador from the city. Ceremonious courtesy, with complimentary 
turns of poetic phrase, seems to induce harmonious social relations, 
with mutual congratulation for one another’s honor. It is the breakdown 
of this ideal of courtesy that leads to rape and to rebellion against the 
Catholic monarchs, Ferdinand and Isabella. When the women of the 
village insult the men and murder the Comendador, the villagers are 
saved from punishment, and order is restored, by the quasi-magical word 
“Fuenteovejuna,” repeated unanimously by everyone being interrogated 
under torture: it is an Austinian performative which the royal judge must 
fi nally accept as a fait accompli.
This, then, is the behavioristic, or perhaps Heideggerian, extreme 
of our spectrum of language’s different social functions: we memorize 
traditional words, which, when repeated, quite simply do our thinking 
for us, by seeming to be the Truth. When I leave my girl-friend behind, 
I tell her that “Absence makes the heart grow fonder,” and she replies, 
“Out of sight, out of mind”: popular verbal culture supplies us in this way 
with countless clichés, allowing us to justify ourselves by citing their 
authority. And Georges Poulet is not far from this end of the spectrum 
when he describes what happens to us as we read a readerly text: we 
lose ourselves in it, we allow a traditional literary subjectivity to replace 
our own, and, as we read, we go thus quietly, even quixotically, mad 
(1970:57-62).
What is the other and opposite end of the spectrum? Here Bakhtin 
is extremely suggestive. In opposition to what he calls monoglossia—
that is, the idealistic belief of a traditional ethnocentric culture that there 
is a single truth-bearing language (classical French, for example) that 
is totally unifi ed in a synchronic, structural way—Bakhtin emphasizes 
what he fi nds to be the more immediate, materialistic, and primary 
reality of parole (not langue), of heteroglossia, of disparate utterances 
in different
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social and geographical and historical dialects and vernaculars, utterances 
that are all trying to make sense to one another as, in dialogue, they tend 
toward the formation of new and different languages and ideologies for 
the future. For Bakhtin, as for Austin, utterances are primarily social acts; 
but whereas Austin emphasizes the conventional rules that constitute or 
govern such acts, Bakhtin fi nds in them radical ambiguity and ideological 
creativity, that is, the constant revision of conventional rules. To quote 
from the English translation of Voloshinov’s, or Bakhtin’s, Marxism and 
the Philosophy of Language: “In each speech act, subjective experience 
perishes in the objective fact of the enunciated word-utterance, and the 
enunciated word is subjectifi ed in the act of responsive understanding 
in order to generate, sooner or later, a counter statement” (1973:40-41). 
This intersubjective process of producing socially objective language 
cannot, according to Bakhtin, be analyzed in the static grammatical 
or structural terms of monoglossia, but must be seen as a historical 
process of evaluative dialogue: this is Bakhtin’s grass-roots matrix of 
ideological tendencies, tendencies which may become, it seems to me, 
eventually fossilized as monoglossic codes. But, in its historical context, 
each heteroglossic utterance is unique, provoking a different interaction 
between speaker and hearer. Bakhtin cites a passage from Dostoyevski 
in which the same vulgar word (“merde” in Russian, no doubt) is used 
by six different speakers with six different intonations and six different 
ideological evaluations, ranging from fl at condemnations to high 
praise. And, in a more complex and humorous way, Cervantes has done 
something similar with the Spanish phrase “hi de puta” in Don Quixote 
(Part II, chapter 13).
Bakhtin’s social concept of dialogue, or of an unending historical 
process that is both intersubjective and materially objectifi ed in words, 
is basic to his theory of the novel as the constantly developing devourer 
of all established literary genres, including preceding novels. He praises 
the novel as the sort of literary discourse which, by his own defi nition, 
reveals the true heteroglossic nature of historically developing language 
and ideology; conversely, he seems to condemn epic poetry as the 
sort of literature that incarnates the false structural and monoglossic 
principle of fossilized language and anti-historical, utopian, synchronic 
authoritarianism.
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But here I pose a question: can heteroglossia exist without 
monoglossia of some sort, to serve both as its point of departure and 
as its own tendency? It seems to me that the myth of a single unifi ed 
language of truth not only makes epic poetry and ritualistic formulas 
possible, but is also necessary as a foil for mock epic, for parody of all 
sorts, for Rabelaisian carnival, and for the novel itself insofar as that 
language is essentially anti-monoglossic. We must at least temporarily 
indulge in the myth before we can deconstruct it.
Let us turn from this literary question to the broader question 
with which we began: the range of varying social functions of language 
in everyday use. No one can deny the real social existence of ritualistic 
formulas: if I say “thank you” to the check-out person as she or he 
tells me to have a nice day, and if we both understand one another 
and even feel better about our fl eeting encounter after repeating these 
banal phrases, then monoglossia does have a real social function, and, I 
suspect, a universally important one. To sing The Star-spangled Banner 
is not the same thing as to have an intelligent dialogue; both of these 
verbal activities, however, are occasionally indulged in by the same 
American citizens. We must, I think, not only recognize the coexistence 
of monoglossia and heteroglossia, but also try to analyze further their 
productive interaction.
Some years ago the American sociolinguist Charles Ferguson 
invented a concept, which he called “diglossia,” to cover the 
complementary relationship in certain cultures between one classical 
written language and the different vernacular(s): in German Switzerland, 
for example, or in Haiti, a local dialect or creole is learned at home as the 
mother tongue, and another quite different standard written language is 
learned at school, not only for reading and writing, but also for speaking 
and listening, under certain more formal circumstances. In Bakhtin’s 
terms, the standard written language is more or less monoglossic, as the 
fi xed vehicle of high offi cial culture, while the spoken vernacular is more 
heteroglossic, as the varied and freely developing medium of everyday 
conversation. But even more profoundly heteroglossic is the interplay 
between both of them: this phenomenon is what Bakhtin fi nds to be 
particularly productive culturally in such a period as the Renaissance, 
which had a complex diglossia involving the humanists’ neoclassical 
Greek and Latin, the Church’s scholastic
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and liturgical Latin, and the infi nitely various vernaculars of different 
marketplaces and of nascent nations; Rabelais’ carnival of languages is an 
objective-subjective interplay of all three of these complex registers.
Father Ong has described in terms strikingly similar to those of 
Bakhtin what happens in true dialogue (1982:176):
Human communication, verbal and other, differs from the “medium” 
model most basically in that it demands anticipated feedback in order 
to take place at all. In the medium model, the message is moved from 
sender-position to receiver-postion. In real human communication, 
the sender has to be not only in the sender position but also in the 
receiver postion before he or she can send anything.
As I approach my tentative conclusion, I would like to cite 
Cervantes’ Don Quixote as the text within which the heteroglossic novel 
is fi rst fully realized, with dialogue at many different levels. Its necessary 
monoglossic point of departure is of course the romance of chivalry, 
what Northrop Frye has called “the secular scripture”: this archaic 
narrative code of heroic behavior, reinforced in Spain by the oral media 
of ballads and of Lope de Vega’s popular theater, is what constitutes Don 
Quixote’s madness when reenacted within the heteroglossic chronotope 
of modern roads and inns and palaces, where different social classes and 
literary idioms meet and mingle in dialogue. Cervantes’ central dialogue 
is that of an archetypal comic pair: the tall, thin, ascetic, aristocratic 
landowner and reader of books, and the short, fat, guzzling, landless 
peasant, who can neither read nor write. These two characters, when 
they fi nd themselves isolated as a pair on the road or in the woods, 
have endless meandering conversations, exploring each other’s range of 
words, ideas, values. Initially the literate member of the pair seems to 
have all the advantages: his linguistic range includes not only his own 
Renaissance library, but many of the oral sayings and Latin quotations 
that Sancho Panza uses in a garbled way. But the illiterate representative 
of the lower classes eventually acquires control of his master’s literary 
idiom and with it is able to convince Don Quixote that his lady Dulcinea 
is enchanted, apparently transformed into a smelly peasant girl, which 
had been in fact Dulcinea’s fl esh-and-blood
 TWO FUNCTIONS OF SOCIAL DISCOURSE 257
source. The affection and the struggle for control are both always comic, 
as is the apparently aimless process of conversation on such topics as 
which deed is greater: to kill a giant (the deed of a knight errant) or to 
raise someone from the dead (the deed of a saint). The growing dialogic 
area of overlap between the two characters provides a free play of 
heteroglossia, which reveals self-contradictions within the more or less 
offi cial monoglossic codes of knightly honor and saintly virtue, of Don 
Quixote’s Ciceronian, hypotactic prose and of Sancho Panza’s popular, 
paratactic aphorisms. Without these monoglossic codes, I submit, the 
heteroglossia of the novel could not even have come into existence, 
much less come to an end in the recantation of Don Quixote, who writes 
his last will and testament in correct legal style before declaring his 
repentance and making his deathbed confession as a good Catholic.
The basis for our two functions of social discourse is no doubt 
the structure of the linguistic sign itself: a material “signifi er” (whether 
phonetic, chirographic, typographic, or electromagnetic) associated in 
a problematic way with a more diffuse mental “signifi ed” (subjective, 
intersubjective, lexicographic). The signifi er, divorced from the signifi ed, 
may be reproduced in a mechanical way, subject to the lapsus linguae 
(calami) of mnemonic (graphic) confusion: “Lead us not into Penn 
Station,” says the little boy, allowing the acoustic substitution of one 
syllable for another to garble a sacred text. The association of sounds in 
oral formulas is a sort of writing, in Derrida’s words, “avant la lettre” : 
it makes possible the recitation of thousands of lines of poetry, without 
their necessarily deriving from any fi xed sort of sense or personally 
intended meaning. But, when those lines are heard or read, they may 
well evoke a sense or meaning in the hearer or reader, even transforming 
him or her in some inner way; and, of course, the hearer may well be the 
same person as the reciter.
But what if one starts, not with the ready-made signifi er, but 
with a more or less vague sense of meaning, of trying to say something 
to someone? One then searches for a word, a linguistic sign with some 
more or less appropriate signifi ed, and, with the help of “anticipated 
feedback,” eventually settles for a given signifi er: within a given social 
context, or historical community, original human communication is in 
this way somehow possible.
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And yet.. .
     Words strain, 
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden,
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish,
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place,
Will not stay still. . . (Four Quartets, “Burnt Norton,” 150-54).
The world of historical time, of sociolinguistic process, does not permit, 
either for Bakhtin or for Eliot, any ultimate permanence of meaning.
In conclusion, I will assert again the necessary coexistence of 
varying degrees of monoglossia and heteroglossia in any culture or 
community or literary text: one function of language provides for the 
apparently univocal use of the same words by different people, and 
the other permits skeptical analysis of traditional formulas, equivocal 
explorations of new ideological possibilities, innovative social discourse, 
and the novelty of new novels.
State University of New York 
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